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THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
Edited by David Kennedy and William W. Fisher III.
Princeton University Press, 2006.
REVIEWED BY ROBERT E. RODES, JR.

Professors Kennedy and Fisher have put together a book containing twenty
essays, most of them first published in law reviews. They are elegantly
presented, and each is preceded by an introductory essay by one of the editors,
which provides background information on the author, analyzes the piece
lucidly and succinctly, and situates it in the development of American legal
thought. Each piece is also preceded by a bibliography, which further situates
it by describing the rest of the author's work and summarizing the commentary
it has evoked. All the works are given in full, adding considerably to what can
be learned from the casebook extracts. It is interesting, for instance, to learn
what cases Felix Cohen uses to illustrate his famous TranscendentalNonsense
and the FunctionalApproach (173), and to find on looking them up that they
are neither transcendental nor nonsense.'
Kennedy and Fisher call their book The Canon ofAmerican Legal Thought,
and characterize the works included as "the twenty most important works of
American legal thought" (ix). Any reviewer worth his salt will naturally take
such a claim as a challenge. Actually, though, there are only a few works
included that I would have left out, or left out that I would have included. First
of all, I would have put in something by Roscoe Pound. To be sure, the most
important expressions of his thought are in books rather than law review
articles, but the books have freestanding chapters that could have been used.2
Among law review articles, I would not have left out Charles Reich's "The
New Property" 3 or Margaret Jane Radin's "Property and Personhood."4 In
explaining their choices (12-14), the editors tell us that they have relied to a
considerable extent on what weight their colleagues in the legal academy
assign to different works. They were sorry, they tell us, to find so little
1. For instance, he is scornful of a line of cases on whether a foreign corporation can be
served with process in a state. But the arguments would be no different if it were a natural
person residing in another state and being served through his local agents. Cohen may be right
in preferring arguments more addressed to the practical consequences of deciding one way or
the other. But the arguments actually used are, as I say, neither transcendental nor nonsense.
2. I use in my Jurisprudence course "The Courts and the Crown," Chapter III of The Spirit
of the Common Law, and "The Task of Law," Chapter III of Social Control Through Law.
3. Yale Law Journal73 (1964) 734.
4. Stanford Law Review 34 (1982) 957.
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mention of Reich's work among colleagues today. I believe that is because his
insights have so thoroughly prevailed in the law that questions about them are
no longer interesting. The editors do not mention Radin at all; neither, presumably, do their colleagues. I suppose that is because her insights have not
yet come into their own. I think they are more important than many of the
insights deployed here.
As for criticism of what the editors chose to include, I would say first that
they have done an injustice to Karl Llewellyn by using "Some Realism about
Realism" (141), which is, after all, more a compendium of other people's
thought than an example of his own. My choice would have been "Law
Observance versus Law Enforcement., 5 In the case of Robert Cover, I would
have preferred his "Nomos and Narrative" 6 to the editors' choice of "Violence
and the Word" (753). The latter piece devotes a great deal of its argument to
the death penalty, which is so far sui generis that nothing one says about it can
be applied with confidence to anything else.
On Feminist Jurisprudence, the editors have chosen "Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State" (847 and 869), a two-part article by Catharine
MacKinnon. For Critical Race Theory, they have used the Introduction by
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Niel Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas to an
anthology on the subject, CriticalRace Theory: The Key Writings thatFormed
the Movement (903). In both cases, the editors seem to have chosen a more
sweeping critique of existing institutions over a more practical one.7 In other
works, MacKinnon has told us very clearly and persuasively where she thinks
the law goes wrong in its treatment of women and what she thinks should be
done about it. 8 Here, though, her main complaint about the law seems to be
that too many men are involved in making and applying it. In the case of
Critical Race Theory, the function of an Introduction is to introduce, so the

5. Proceedingsof the Conference on Social Work 127 (1928).
6. HarvardLaw Review 97 (1983) 4.
7. Perhaps my disagreement with the editors here relates to the distinction between Legal
Theory and Jurisprudence, which they develop briefly on pp. 2-3. Jurisprudence seems to be
more centrally concerned than Legal Theory with what will enhance the wisdom and
resourcefulness of working lawyers. Yale Law School Professor Robert W. Gordon says in a
back cover blurb that Legal Theory is "of more general interest to law students than
jurisprudence." I hope he is mistaken. For my view of the scope of Jurisprudence, see my
PilgrimLaw (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 1-3. For another take
on the relation between the legal academy and working lawyers, see Mary Ann Glendon's
critique of "The New Academy," A Nation under Lawyers (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 1994), 199-229.
8. E.g., "Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination," Boston UniversityLawReview
71 (1991) 793; "Reflections on Sex Equality under Law," Yale Law Journal100 (1991) 1281.
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editors have introduced us to a whole body of material without giving us any
of it to read.
In any event, it is pretty clear that sixteen of the twenty articles in the
collection belong there. I will not attempt an extensive comment on any of
them; each has been extensively commented on, and the results have been
cited and discussed by our editors. I will try rather to point out a few common
threads running through the whole body of the material. These do seem to be,
as the editors intended, the main themes of American legal thought in the
twentieth century. The works are divided both chronologically and thematically, pursuant to the editors' perception of the way in which themes succeed
one another in the ascendency. In my own thematic treatment, however, I will
disregard the chronology.
The whole enterprise seems to be set in motion by a new awareness that law
is not merely a set of general rules--do this; don't do that-to be applied by
judges to particular cases that come before them. The law has a task, and its
practitioners, judges, lawyers, legislators, administrators, and all, have a set of
tools with which to carry it out. These papers are all devoted to refining the
tools, reformulating the task, or both. Holmes's "The Path of the Law" (29),
with which the collection naturally begins, began the attack on rules and
deductions. John Dewey, whose "Logical Method and Law" is included here
(23), offers a philosophical coherence to the idea of testing rules by their effect
on cases as they come up. Felix Cohen's piece, to which I have already
referred, urges us to reorganize our legal concepts to reflect what we want to
accomplish with them.
Conceptual refinement is of course the main theme of Wesley Hohfeld's
"Fundamental Legal Concepts" (55), source of the "Hohfeldian" analysis so
familiar to law students of my generation. Other works in the collection also
seem primarily aimed at conceptual refinement. Thus, Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed in "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral" (415) offer what they call a framework for classifying
property rights and entitlements in accordance with their susceptibility to
transfer. Duncan Kennedy, one of the founders of the Critical Legal Studies
movement, is represented here by "Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication" (661), in which he relates different ways ofj udging to different
views of the relation between the individual and society. Marc Galanter, in
"Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change" (495), shows how our system of litigation favors "repeat players"
over "one-shotters," and offers a few suggestions for leveling the playing
field..
Articles that can be regarded as reformulating the task begin with a 1923
piece by Robert Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
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coercive State" (93). Hale points out that the distinction between interfering
with the economy and letting it alone is illusory: protecting property and
enforcing contracts is as much of an interference as confiscating property and
invalidating contracts. It follows that we cannot avoid deciding what approach
is best in a given situation. Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form" (221)
deploys a rather similar insight in analyzing the rationale for requiring a
showing of consideration if contracts are to be enforced. Ronald Coase, in
"The Problem of Social Cost" (365), looks at the law of nuisance in terms of
weighing gains to one party against losses to another, and so lays the foundation for the Law and Economics movement.
There are three articles in the collection that call for rethinking tools and
task together. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sachs, in a segment of their
unpublished (albeit fairly widely distributed) casebook, The Legal Process:
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (255), deal with the
multiplicity of tribunals, proceedings, and negotiations set in motion by a
carload of spoiled melons, bidding their students take the whole apparatus into
account, and see how it does or does not support fair dealing between
merchants and a supply of fresh fruit for the public. Stewart Macaulay, in
"Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study" (465), uses the
tools of sociology to examine how the law of contracts and its enforcement
affect the actual practice of business people in dealing with one another.
Abraham Chayes, in "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (612),
considers the way litigation is often used not so much to determine the dispute
between the parties as to establish what the law is to be for everyone.
To the extent that judges, with their limited political accountability, make
laws rather than apply laws made by other people, a serious question of
legitimacy arises. By what right do these people, accountable to no one but
themselves, make our laws for us? Chayes raises the question, but is content
to leave it pretty much up in the air. Three articles address it directly. Herbert
Wechsler's "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (325) argues
that judicial decisions are legitimate if they are "principled," and that they are
principled if they rest "on reasons that in their generality and their neutrality
transcend any immediate result that is involved" (337). Ronald Dworkin, in his
article, "Hard Cases" (564), develops a much more elaborate theory of
principled judging. He distinguishes between "principles," which are for the
courts, and policies, which are for the legislature. "Arguments of principle are
arguments intended to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are
arguments intended to establish a collective goal" (570). Arguments of
principle are the ones it is proper for a judge to consider. Frank Michelman,
in "Law's Republic" (790) (perhaps named in response to Dworkin's book,
Law's Empire), puts Dworkin's two concepts back together, and suggests that
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the courts are simply one of a number of elements through which a social
consensus on "republican" values is developed and maintained: "Why ought
the Supreme Court not be an organ of politics if that is what it takes to secure
liberty and justice...?" (792).
Putting all this material together, what can we learn about the way the work
of the law has been carried on in our country during the century just ended? A
few things, I am sure, of enduring value. First of all, that law is a technology,
not a mere deductive science. Our profession places us in control of powerful
forces that have a profound effect on the world around us, and it behooves us
to know what we are doing when we deploy them. Anyone who helps us learn
more about what we are doing, as several of these authors do, is doing us a
service. Second, judges have choices to make in deciding cases. Their
decisions are not determined for them either by existing legal materials or by
the facts proved before them. On the other hand, they are not free to dispose
of people's affairs exactly as they think best. They must look for principles
which, if they are not "neutral," will at least enable them to treat like cases
alike.
It is here that these authors, and, with them, the whole intellectual enterprise
they represent, are less than successful. For instance, when Wechsler advocates
neutral principles, he says very little about neutral as between what and what.
Dworkin, in distinguishing between policies and principles, has nothing much
to say about where to find either. Duncan Kennedy formulates a dichotomy
between "individualism" and "altruism" in such a way that one is about as
unattractive as the other. His individualism seems to be purely egotistical, his
altruism purely communitarian, so that any vision of a society of individuals
treating each other decently seems to fall between the cracks. Michelman
appeals to something that looks very like a Volksgeist,9 but takes no account
of the inherent moral ambivalence of the Volk beyond expressing a wistful
trust in the judiciary to make things come out right.
There is no point going on with these thumbnail critiques of the different
authors. What they add up to is that nowhere in the collection is there a
guiding vision of right and wrong, or of the role of law in embodying the best
moral reflection of the community, and showing how we can all live comfortably together and encourage one another to do good and avoid evil. That, of
course, is not the fault of the editors. They cannot be expected to include
material that is not there to be included. Rather, by putting together so much
and such wide-ranging material, they have newly underlined a continuing
defect in American legal theory, and, indeed, in American law.
9. See my "On the Historical School of Jurisprudence," American JournalofJurisprudence 49 (2004) 165.
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The works in this collection may not be indisputably the twenty most
important works of American legal thought, if, indeed, there is any criterion
by which the importance of such works can be measured. But they are all very
good, and they are all examples-some of them seminal examples-of
important trends. With their generous and lucid critical and bibliographic
introductions," they will surely come to be the first place anyone will look
who wants to find out about one of the schools or authors represented. If they
are not now the Canon of American Legal Thought, this book will go far
toward making them so.

10. I count 159 pages of introduction and 55 pages of bibliography to 623 pages of articles.

